Deduction of Attorneys\u27 Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes by McDonald, Donald
[Vol. 103
DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES*
Donald McDonald t
When you bill a client for your legal services, he may well ask,
"Is this fee deductible in computing my income tax?" The answer is
not always easy. The permissible income tax benefit varies widely.
The fee may have been for services wholly personal, and therefore
in no way deductible. It may have to be added to the cost of an asset.
If the asset is non-depreciable, the fee becomes deductible only when
the asset is sold or abandoned. If the asset is subject to exhaustion,
there will be an annual tax benefit through depreciation, amortization,
or depletion. If your fee is immediately deductible, it may reduce or-
dinary income by the full amount, or it may only reduce a capital gain
or increase a capital loss. One fee covering several types of service
may have to be divided and the parts deducted in different ways.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
To be deductible attorneys' fees must be for a service qualifying as
a deduction under some section of the Internal Revenue Code,' without
* This Article will discuss the following matters:
Page
General Principles ........................................................ 168
Personal Expenses ................... .................................... 171
Capital Expenditures ...................................................... 172
Tax Exempt Items ........................................................ 176
Fees Paid for Another .................................................... 177
Public Policy ............................................................ 178
D efense of Title ........................................................... 184
Trade or Business Expenses ............................................... 190
Investment and Tax Expenses .............................................. 193
A llocation ................................................................ 204
-A.B., 1939, LL.B., 1942, Harvard University. Member of the Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Nebraska Bars. Secretary, Committee on Taxation, Philadelphia
Bar Association.
1. E.g., Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
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falling afoul of either statutory 2 or non-statutory 3 proscriptions.
Since 1913, the income tax laws have allowed a full deduction
against ordinary income for all the ordinary and necessary expenses in
carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for
compensation for personal services actually rendered.' Since 1942 the
Codes have allowed individuals a similar deduction for all the ordinary
and necessary expenses for the production or collection of income, or for
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income.' The 1954 Code has made it clear that
expense "in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of
any tax" is fully deductible.'
Beyond these broad allowances, sums paid for legal services may
increase deductions permitted under the Code and regulations for
uninsured corporate losses 7 or individual losses in trade, business, or
transactions entered into for profit,' for depreciation ' or depletion,"0
or may reduce gain or increase loss by offsetting part of the selling price
realized " or increasing the adjusted basis. 2
Lawyers' fees have had little difficulty generally in meeting the con-
tinued statutory requirement that expenses be "ordinary and neces-
2. In several sections, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 flatly denies a deduction
for specific expenses. Lawyers' fees often fall within this list. No deduction is
allowed for:
(1) "personal, living, or family expenses," INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954,
§262, formerly INTERNAL REvENUE CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (1); (Hereafter the
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, 68A STAT. 3 et seq. (1954), will be cited I.R.C.).
(2) "any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate," I.R.C.
§263(a) (1), formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §24(a)(2);
(3) "any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the ex-
haustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made," I.R.C. § 263 (a) (2),
formerly INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (3) ;
(4) amounts allocable to tax exempt income (other than tax exempt interest
received by a business), I.R.C. § 265, formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (5)
cf. I.R.C. § 265(2) and INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(b).
3. E.g., fees paid for the benefit of another, contrary to public policy, or for the
defense of title are not deductible. Edelmann, Non Trade or Non. Business Expenses,
7 ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 965-77 (1949).
4. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1), formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §23(a) (1) (A).
5. I.R.C. § 212, formerly INT. RFv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (2).
6. I.R.C. § 212(3) (italics added). While previously costs of determining many
taxes had been deductible, the costs of determining gift taxes had not.
7. I.R.C. § 165 (a), formerly INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(f).
8. I.R.C. § 165(c), formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(e).
9. I.R.C. § 167, formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §23(1) (1).
10. I.R.C. §611, formerly INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §23(m).
11. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.24(a)-2(a) (1953); cf. I.R.C. §1034(b).
12. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1), formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 113(b) (1) (A).
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sary." 's Justice Cardozo chose them as the natural illustration of the
meaning of the words, when he said:
"Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments
must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer
will have to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a
business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be
so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is
an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments
for such a purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are
common and accepted means of defense against attack." 14
If they are challenged as extraordinary or unnecessary, the payment
will probably involve a question of business morality or public pol-
icy. 5 Fees have been held necessary whether 1' or not ' a lawsuit
has been brought.
Both business 1s and non-business 19 expenses must be "reason-
able" to be deductible. The Commissioner has seldom brought this
issue to litigation, however, where attorneys' fees have been involved."0
The deduction is allowed for current expenses "paid or incurred
during the taxable year." 21 If your client is on the cash basis, it makes
no difference when you send him your bill. He gets his deduction, if
any, when he pays. But if he is on the accrual basis, when the amount
of the fee is undetermined and he has no arrangement with you that
would allow him to make a reasonably accurate estimate of your charge,
the deduction is allowed in the year the bill is sent, even though the
services have been performed in a prior year.'
13. A requirement the American Law Institute would drop. Cf. 1 FEDERAL
INComE TAX STATuTE 268, § X 151(b), comments (Feb. 1954 draft). The present
law is closely examined on this point in Bruton, The Deductibili y of Legal Expenses
in Computing Income Tax, 3 S.C.L.Q. 107, 109-17 (1950).
14. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
15. For a general discussion of the influence of "public policy" see text beginning
at note 116 infra; cf. Estate of Lashells, 11 CCH TC MEMi. DEc. 274, 282 (1952);
Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941).
16. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 152 (1928).
17. Waldo Salt, 18 T.C. 182, 186 (1952).
18. I.R.C. § 162 (a) (1).
19. SEx. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
504, 571 and H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
372, 430 state: "Expenses, to be deductible under Sec. 23(a)(2) must be ordinary
and necessary, which rule presupposes that they must be reasonable in amount. . . ."
20. In Indialantic, Inc., 12 CCII TC MEm. DEc. 880 (1953), a deduction for a
$50,000 fee was cut to $17,500, rev'd and remanded, 5 CCH 1954 FED. TAX REP.
119629 (6th Cir.).
21. I.R.C. § 162 (a).
22. The Cold Metal Process Co., 17 T.C. 916 (1951), aff'd, 1 CCH 1953 TAX
CT. REP. 19135 (6th Cir. 1952); cf. Kanne v. American Factors, Ltd., 190 F.2d
155, 160-61 (9th Cir. 1951).
DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
PERSONAL EXPENSES
No deduction is allowed for payments for legal services in pri-
marily personal matters&" Much of the general practitioner's work
is of this kind, including the preparation of wills; 24 the prosecution or
defense of actions to recover damages for personal injuries,' for de-
struction or seizure of non-income producing property,2" for libel 27 or
slander,2 or for breach of promise; 29 or the prosecution or defense of
actions for separation or divorce,30 for the commitments' or release
of an incompetent,32 or to secure a release from the armed forces.m
Other expenses held to be personal are those which do not meet
all the requirements 3 4 permitting. a deduction of expenses "for the
management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the
23. See note 1 supra.
24. Estate of Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926).
25. W. S. Dickason, 20 B.T.A. 496 (1930) (defense); if the accident was in-
cident to taxpayer's business the costs of defense would be deductible. S.M. 4078,
V-1 Cur. BuLL. 226 (1926); O.D. 1117, 5 Cum. BuLL. 121 (1921).
26. Fred J. Hughes, 1 B.T.A. 944 (1925) (recovering seized liquor).
27. Robert Edward Kleinschmidt, 12 T.C. 921 (1949) (plaintiff). Newspapers,
publishers or professional authors can, however, deduct the cost of defense.
28. Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932) (plaintiff).
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 3924(a)-1 (1953) ; I.T. 1804, 11-2 Ctr. BuLL. 61
(1923); I.T. 2422, VII-2 Cum. BULL. 186 (1928); O.D. 275, 1 Cum. BuLL. 159
(1919).
30. U.S. Treas. Reg 118, §3924(a)-i (1953); Henry Sanderson, 23 B.T.A.
304 (1931); Lindsay C. Yfoward, 16 T.C. 157 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir.
1953); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C. 916 (1951); Thorne Donnelley, 16 T.C. 1196
(1951); Andrew Jergens, 17 T.C. 806 (1951); Estate of Smith, 11 CCH TC Msa.
DEC. 1167 (1952); S. B. Tressler, 12 CCH TC Mmi. DEC. 358 (1953). The serv-
ices related to affecting the marital status must be separated from the deductible
costs of securing taxable alimony, T.D. 5889, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 31, and cases cited
note 300 infra, or the preservation in a property settlement of specific income pro-
ducing property, Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952), and text at
note 335 infra.
31. Croker v. Burnet, 62 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; Esther Rentie, 21 B.T.A.
1230 (1931).
32. Eugene E. Hinkle, 47 B.T.A. 670 (1942).
33. Robert S. Seese, 7 T.C. 925 (1946).
34. Not all expenses of property management are deductible, but only those that
meet all of the following requirements:
(1) the property must be of a kind which may produce income, see text at note
328 infra;
(2) the income it will produce must be for the taxpayer, see text at note 256infra;
(3) the taxpayer must hold it for the purpose of producing income or mini-
mizing loss, see text at note 255 infra;
(4) the expense must be for maintaining, conserving or managing the property
as contrasted with its acquisition or disposition other than a sale, see text at note
85 infra and discussion of Nanciy Reynolds Bagley following note 338 infra. For
discussion of disposition by sale, see text following note 303 infra.
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production of income." " Drafting a will,"0 a deed of trust,317 a marital
settlement agreement,' the documents incident to borrowing money 3 9
or renting a house for use as the taxpayer's residence,4" or giving ad-
vice about making gifts,4 ' or releasing powers of appointment ' all in-
volve property management, but are nondeductible. Efforts to con-
serve the taxpayer's property generally, by defending him as an en-
dorser on a defaulted note," or securing a reduction in the rate of in-
terest he pays,44 or formerly by contesting a gift tax deficiency,45 have
also been dismissed as personal.
Sometimes expenses are classified "personal" to lend statutory
support to the denial of deductions for legal expenses in vaguely color-
able situations, such as disbarment proceedings 46 or reinstatement to
practice before the Treasury."
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Legal fees which are chargeable to capital account for improve-
ments or to increase the value of any property or estate are not cur-
rently deductible." While the 1954 Code " continues all the language
of the 1939 Code,"° it does clarify the section by titling it "Capital Ex-
penditures." There is still no definition of the concept."
35. I.R.C. § 212(2).
36. Estate of Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926).
37. Nancy R. Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947); R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943).
38. See note 30 supra. But a contrary result is reacled where the control of a
corporation is preserved to taxpayer in such a settlement. See Baer v. Commissioner,
196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952) and text at note 335 infra.
39. Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 361 (1943).
40. R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943).
41. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
42. Nancy R. Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947) ; John W. Willmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943).
43. Donald V. Smith, 6 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 548 (1947).
44. Bernard Volk, Jr., 12 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 184 (1953).
45. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(k) (1953) ; Lykes v. United States, 343
U.S. 118 (1952); Frank M. Cobb, 10 T.C. 380 (1948). As indicated above the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 212, now permits these fees to be deducted.
46. Louis S. Levy, 1 CCH TC MEa. DEC. 226 (1942). But cf. Morgan S.
Kaufman, 12 T.C. 1114 (1949) (decision did not involve fees incurred in the related
disbarment). For further discussion of fees paid in defense of disbarment pro-
ceedings, see text at note 138 infra.
47. Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941). Cf. the Commis-
sioner's position in Hymie Schwartz, 22 T.C. No. 91 (1954).
48. I.R.C. § 263.
49. I.R.C. §263.
"50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §24(a) (2) (3).
51. The American Law Institute gives an excellent definition, reflecting the
trend of most of the existing cases. An expenditure is capital "only if . . . it is
made primarily for the acquisition, development, or improvement . . . of an asset,
interest, or income producing status . . ." when either the asset acquired or the
benefit derived will last beyond the close of the taxable year. It contrasts ac-
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Capital expenditures, while not deducted as current expenses, do
reduce income later by way of depreciation if the property has a de-
terminable life and is held to produce income " or in a business. 3 If the
property does not have a determinable life, the capital expenditure is
recovered as increased loss or reduced gain upon abandonment or dis-
position. 4
Before the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, expenses of organiz-
ing corporations, including legal fees, were not deductible until the cor-
poration was liquidated.5 When such fees are paid or incurred after
the date of its enactment, the 1954 Code allows the taxpayer to elect
to treat them as a deferred expense and deduct them over any period
of not less than five years.56 The congressional committee reports
are careful to point out that this election does not apply to expenditures
connected with reorganizations of a corporation unless incident to the
creation of an additional corporation, nor to the expenses of issuing
shares of stock; 7 the present case law is also continued for partner-
ship organizations. 8 Of course, if the newly provided election is not
made, and if such costs are still identifiable on the books, a corporation
may deduct organizational fees as a loss when it is completely liqui-
dated. 9 But if the liquidation is part of a merger or reorganization,
the loss is not then realized.6° The loss is realized when the corporate
properties are actually distributed in liquidation, not when a plan to
liquidate is adopted.6 If distributions occur in several years, the cor-
poration shiould claim the loss not later than the year in which the bulk
of the properties have been dispersed.
quisition, development or improvement with preservation or maintenance expenses
which, while restoring the original property life, do not increase it beyond the
origial life expectancy. 1 FEDERAL INcOmE TAX STATUTE 284, 285, § X166, com-
ments (Feb. 1954 draft).
52. I.R.C. § 167(a) (2).
53. I.R.C. §167(a) (1).
54. I.R.C. §§ 165(a), 165(c) (1) and (2).
55. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24-a(2) (1953); Guarantee Bond & Mortgage
Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc.,
11 B.T.A. 1192 (1928) ; F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B.T.A. 799 (1925).
56. I.R.C. § 248.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A 64 (1954) ; SEN. REP. No. 1635,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1954).
58. Abe Wolkowitz, 8 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 754 (1949).
59. Malta Temple Association, 16 B.T.A. 409 (1929), acq., X111-2 Cum. BULL.
12 (1934).
60. Citizens Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 392 (1930).
61. City & Suburban Mortgage Co., 26 B.T.A. 179 (1932).
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The expenses of amending the corporate charter and authorizing,"2
issuing, e  and initially listing' an increase in capital stock are capital
and not deductible, either at the time of the stock issue or upon
dissolution,' redemption " or exchange. The expenses of a bond
issue, however, are deductible substantially like interest over the period
of the loan," and the costs of redemption are fully deductible.
Although the cost of legal advice in connection with a taxable,
complete liquidation has long been held to be fully deductible if paid
or accrued before the formal dissolution of a corporation, 9 the Com-
missioner only recently acquiesced in these cases, thus removing any
doubts 70 of the availability of the deduction. The services involved
must be rendered before, not after, dissolution. 71 If the cost of liquida-
tion is assumed by another acquiring the liquidated company's assets,
the costs merely increase the cost of the assets acquired; 72 but, if they
are billed to and paid by the liquidated company, the deduction is per-
mitted immediately, whether the assets are conveyed to trustees " or
to a parent corporation.
7 4
62. Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928); Durham Brothers & Co.,
P-H 1932 BTA Mzm. D~c. ff 32,205 (1932).
63. Commissions-Corning Glass Works v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C.
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930); Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 33
F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 588 (1929) ; legal and other expense-
Surety Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Commercial In-
vestment Trust Corp., 28 B.T.A. 143 (1933), aff'd per curiam, 74 F.2d 1015 (2d
Cir. 1935); William Cluff Co., 7 B.T.A. 662 (1927); Emerson Electric Mfg. Co.,
3 B.T.A. 932 (1926).
64. Gulf, Mobile & Northern R.R., 22 B.T.A. 233 (1931). In contrast, the
annual listing fee is deductible currently. Chesapeake Corp. of Virginia, 17 T.C.
668 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 1.
65. Liquidating Company, 33 B.T.A. 1173 (1936); James I. Van Keuren, 28
B.T.A. 480 (1933); 11-1 CuA. BULL. 293 (1924); 1-1 Cum. BULL. 275 (1922).
66. Merchants Distilling Corp. v. Smith, 2 CCH 1944 TAx CT. REP,. 9359
(S.D. Ind. 1944).
67. Borg & Beck Co., 24 B.T.A. 995 (1931), acq., XI-1 CUM. BULL. 2 (1932)
as to current deduction for local taxes thus incurred.
68. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932); Horn & Hardart
Baking Co., 19 B.T.A. 704 (1930).
69. Rite-Way Products, Inc., 12 T.C. 475 (1949), acq., 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 3,
withdrawn and nonacq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 5, withdrawni and acq., 1954-20 INT.
REv. BULL. 4; E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), acq, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 7,
withdrazun and nonacq., 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 5, zwithdrazn and acq., 1954-20 INT. REV.
BULL. 4; Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), nolw.cq., XIV-1 Cum. BULL.
35 (1935), nonacq., 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 45, withdrawn and acq., 1954-20 INT. REv.
BULL. 4.
70. See Mills Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1953).
71. J. Gilmore Fletcher, 16 T.C. 273 (1951).
72. Cf. Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co., 27 B.T.A. 642 (1933).
73. United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953), affirning 97
F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Tenn. 1951).
74. Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954),
afflirming 12 CCH TC Mmf. DEC. 345 (1953).
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The Tax Court has followed a similar rule, permitting the deduc-
tion of costs of a partial liquidation." However, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has denied any deduction for such costs if re-
capitalization is also involved.70 Possibly the denial can be justified as
analogous to the rules denying a deduction for the demolition of a
building on purchased property to make way for a new one.
77
Expenses of consummated tax-free reorganizations are not de-
ductible, whether effected by way of recapitalization, 78 consolidation,79
merger 8 0 or Section 77-B of the Bankruptcy Act.81  When the pos-
sibility of incorporation or reorganization has been explored and aban-
doned the costs incurred are deductible as a loss.
2
Fees paid for advice or in litigation to establish an exclusive right
to a trade name,8 or in changing zoning " are capital, and, as the
benefit is of indefinite duration, they are not deductible or amortizable.
No deduction is allowed for legal fees for services in the acquisition or
recovery of property 85 even when the main purpose of the services is
management of property to obtain income. 6
75. Tobacco Products Export Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952); Mills Estate, 17
T.C. 910 (1951), rev'd, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
76. Mills Estate v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953). In reaching its
decision, although basing its holding on the recapitalization aspect, the court appeared
to be influenced by the nonacquiescences in the "complete" liquidation cases, which
were withdrawn after its decision. See note 69 supra. Therefore, the vitality of the
circuit court's opinion may be impaired. The decision is criticized in 102 U. oF PA.
L. Rav. 554 (1954) and 6 STANFORD L. REv. 368 (1954).
77. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(e)-2 (1953) ; Anahma Realty Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Int. Rev., 42 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 854 (1930).
78. Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
79. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Handy, 92 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1937).
80. Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936).
81. Bush Terminal Buildings Co., 7 T.C. 793 (1946); International Building
Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
82. Francis A. Parker, 6 T.C. 974 (1946) (plan to incorporate partnership
abandoned); Sibley, Lindsay and Curr Co., 15 T.C. 106 (1950) (reorganization
plans abandoned).
83. Food Fair of Virginia, Inc., 14 T.C. 1089 (1950); Mark W. Allen & Co.,
1 CCH TC MxR. DEc. 887 (1943).
84. Arthur T. Galt, 19 T.C. 892 (1953). However, if the expense is incurred
in an attempt to prevent a change of zoning which would decrease the value of
business or income producing property, the fee should be deductible. It does not
constitute a capital expense because it does not improve the property in relation to
its condition before an application was made to change it. Cf. Memphis Memorial
Park, 28 B.T.A. 1037 (1933).
85. Acquisition of stock: Ernest Smith, 5 CCH TC Mmi. DEC. 7 (1946) ; Jean
Laing Carter, 17 T.C. 994 (1951) (in settlement of patent infringement claim);
Raymond K. Dykema, 12 CCH TC Mni. DEC. 462 (1953) (dividend paying in
exchange for non-dividend paying). Acquisition of other property: leases-Arthur
T. Galt, 19 T.C. 892 (1953) ; possession from lessee-Johnson v. Commissioner,. 162
F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp.
451 (E.D. Mo. 1945); patents-Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d
Cir. 1937). Recovery of property: Thomas A. Kane, 6 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 222
(1947) (stock given under duress) ; Hendrick Ranch Royalties, 1 CCH TC MP-M.
DEC. 794 (1943) (corporate property illegally commingled by corporate officers).
86. Raymond K. Dykema, 12 CCH TC Mas. DEc. 462 (1953).
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TAX EXEMPT ITEMS
Legal fees for the recovery of amounts excluded from gross income
are not deductible."7 The sections of the Code which make the exclu-
sions give a brief catalog of the recoveries, fees for which will be non-
deductible: life insurance proceeds payable by reason of death,"8 em-
ployee's death benefits up to $5,000, s9 gifts and inheritances, 0 tax
exempt interest, 91 compensation for injuries or sickness 02 or received
under accident and health plans," the rental value of parsonages,94 dis-
charge of business indebtedness, 9" improvements on property at the
termination of a lease," armed forces mustering-out payments,
97
scholarships, fellowships," and non-shareholder contributions to a cor-
poration."0
The statutory bar to deduction in Section 265 is not broad enough
to disallow the deduction of fees incurred in collecting punitive damages
or treble damages under the antitrust laws. These items are a tax-
free windfall,' and not "income" wholly exempt from tax. 1 '
87. I.R.C. §265, formerly INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§24(a) (5), 23(b).
88. I.R.C. § 101 (a); National Engraving Co., 3 T.C. 178 (1944).
89. I.R.C. § 101(b).
90. I.R.C. §102; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(k) (1953). The rule
applies whether the litigation is to oust another beneficiary, C. C. McClees, 4 CCH
TC M~m. DEc. 39 (1945), or to obtain a share, Marion A. Burtbeck, 15 T.C. 642
(1950); B. M. Spears, 6 CCH TC Mam. DEC. 303 (1947); Lindley v. Commissioner,
63 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Bula E. Croker, 27 B.T.A. 588 (1933). Note that the
fee is deductible if it is only to increase the taxpayer's share in income. Stella
Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946); William J. Garland, 2 CCH TC MEM. DEC.
419 (1943).
91. I.R.C. § 103. Cynthia K. Herbst, 2 CCH TC Mam. DEC. 361, 362 (1943).
Note that § 265 does not disallow the deduction of any business expenses (other
than interest) allocable to tax exempt interest. This would permit the deduction of
the cost of opinions of counsel and investment advisors as to municipal bonds.
92. I.R.C. § 104. Cf. Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
93. I.R.C. § 105.
94. I.R.C. § 107, which was extended to include a monetary rental allowance
paid in place of supplying the parsonage itself.
95. I.R.C. § 108.
96. I.R.C. § 109.
97. I.R.C. § 113.
98. I.R.C. § 117.
99. I.R.C. § 118.
100. Cf. Glenshaw Glass Co., 18 T.C. 860 (1952), aff'd, 211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.
1954), nonacq., 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 7; William Goldman Theatres, Inc., 19 T.C. 637
(1953), nanacq., 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 8, aff'd, 211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Highland
Farms Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940), acq., 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 5, and nonacq., 1941-1
Cuar. BULL. 16.
101. Section 265 only disallows an expense "allocable to . . . income ...
wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this sub-title." (Italics added.) Nor is
the problem covered by Pennroad Corp., 21 T.C. No 122 (March 31, 1954) which
involved litigation to recoup losses.
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FEES PAID FOR ANOTHER
An attorney's fee, which might be a deductible item to Jones for
whom the work was done, is not deductible by Smith if Smith pays it
unless the payment of the sum directly from Smith to Jones would have
been deductible by Smith.1°2 If this principle is overlooked, deductions
may be lost between husband and former wife,'03 partner and partner-
ship,"04 shareholder and corporation,'05 father and minor son, 06 executor
and estate.1°7 The rule does not apply to. a transferee when he contests
the tax liability of the transferor, since the transferee has a personal ob-
ligation for the tax payment.' While both trust and beneficiary are
separate taxpayers, as a practical matter fees paid by and deductible
to the trust now reduce the beneficiaries' taxable income. 09
The 1954 Code has remedied several inequitable results that have
arisen under this rule. First, in a Clifford-trust situation, the income
of the trust was taxed to the grantor but he was denied the deduction
of its expenses on the ground that the trust was a separate entity; "10
the new law permits such deductions."' Second, under prior law the
remainderman was not allowed to deduct the trustee's terminal com-
mission because it was not the remainderman's obligation;"2 the new
law permits remaindermen to take all deductions of a trust which, in its
last year, were in excess of its income."' Third, the Treasury had
taken the position that when deductible items were charged to trust
corpus the life tenant could receive no benefit." 4 This meant that the
tax benefit was completely lost unless the trust itself realized capital
gains large enough to offset the deduction, yet small enough not to
warrant the use of the alternative tax computation limiting the tax to
102. Cf. Adam, Meldrum & Anderson Co., 19 T.C. 1130 (1953); Note, 66
HARv. L. Rav. 1508 (1953).
103. Andrew Jergens, 17 T.C. 806 (1951); Herbert Marshall, 5 T.C. 1032
(1945). Probably deductible alimony payment to the former wives could have been
arranged since they could have deducted the expenses of contesting their own income
tax deficiencies.
104. B. W. Sturdivant, 15 T.C. 880 (1950).
105. John J. White, P-H 1942 BTA TC MF-a. DEc. 142,288 (1948).
106. Bercaw v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
107. Wayne Henderson, 11 CCH TC MEM~. DEc. 419 (1952); cf. Dorothy E.
Law, 12 CCH TC Mam. DEc. 1440 (1953) (committee and incompetent).
108. Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C. 359 (1946).
109. Mary deF. Harrison Geary, 9 T.C. 8 (1947) (beneficiary); Amy D.
McHenry Trust, 6 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1027 (1947) (beneficiaries and guardians
ad litem).
110. Wade E. Moore, 7 T.C. 1250 (1946).
111. I.R.C. § 671.
112. Anstes V. Agnew, 16 T.C. 1466 (1951).
113. I.R.C. § 642(h).
114. I.T. 3830, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 47.
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twenty-five per cent. The new law assures the trust beneficiaries that
the benefit of a deductible item charged to and paid from corpus will
not be lost."5
PUBLIC POLICY
A long imposed restriction on the deductibility of business ex-
penses is the public policy doctrine: "' disbursements which "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct" are disallowed." 7 Although lacking specific Code recogni-
tion," 8 the doctrine as originally conceived sought statutory support
in the rationale that expenses resulting from unlawful or undesirable
conduct cannot be considered "ordinary and necessary" to a business." 9
This statutory prop was removed in 1943 when the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Heininger 'o stated that the words were to be given
their "commonly accepted meaning" in determining whether the ex-
penditure was "normal" to the taxpayer's business in "the circum-
stances under which [the taxpayer] incurred" them.' 2
In discarding the premise that nothing against public policy was
"ordinary and necessary," the Court in Heininger set new standards
narrowing the bounds of the doctrine; nine years later the Court in
Lilly v. Commissioner ' added even sharper limits. Therefore, in
order to determine the present scope of the public policy restriction,
we must first establish what these two decisions did, and then re-ex-
amine the previous rulings to see how they have been impaired by,
115. I.R.C. §§ 652, 662.
116. This restriction was recognized as early as 1926, in Columbus Bread Co.,
4 B.T.A. 1126. The first case dealing with attorneys' fees was apparently Burroughs
Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). While
the restriction exists, its justification, if any, requires an open admission that "taxable
income" as defined in the Code is not meant to measure an actual economic profit
or loss, but may be warped to add income tax sanctions to disapproved conduct.
But who must disapprove? Legislators, judges, or administrators? The question is
still not answered. Outstanding jurists have not hesitated to add the penalties of an
income tax deduction disallowance. Holmes, J., in Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930), and Learned Hand, J., in Jerry Rossman Corp.
v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949). At the same time
the courts have not seen fit to grant unlegislated income tax benefits for conduct they
approved. Cf. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Griswold, Gross Income
and Deductions, 18 TENN. L. Rv. 539 (1945); Griswold, An Argument Against the
Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative
Grace, 56 HAv. L. Rxv. 1142 (1943).
117. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
118. See Lilly v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 343 U.S. 90, 94 (1952).
119. See Note, 54 HAav. L. Ray. 852, 853 (1941).
120. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
121. Id. at 471, 472.
122. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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and the succeeding ones to see whether they have properly applied, the
Heininger and Lilly reasoning.
The expenses in Heininger were attorneys' fees incurred in the
unsuccessful attempt to set aside a postal fraud order which, if sustained,
threatened to end the taxpayer's business. In holding these fees de-
ductible, the Court applied a two-part test: first, was the expense "or-
dinary and necessary" in a realistic sense to the taxpayer's business;
second, did the expenditure offend sharply defined national or state
public policy? Since both questions must be answered in the tax-
payer's favor to permit a deduction, the ultimate decision can rest
on public policy grounds without reference to any specific section of
the Code. The factors the Court considered in answering the latter
question were (1) whether the purpose of the statute under which the
charges against the taxpayer were brought was to impose "personal
punishment" or was designed only to protect the public, and (2)
whether the defense against the charge was in good faith.
Although not concerned with attorney fees, the Lilly case followed
the bi-partite Heininger test and added the requirement that "the pol-
icies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some
governmental declaration. . ." ' It appears that the Court meant
legislative and not judicial or administrative pronouncements of public
policy.'
2 4
While the scope of the doctrine is difficult to delineate precisely,
the cases may be conveniently classified into four groups: (1) expenses
of defending against charges of criminal business activities; (2) ex-
penses of defending against charges of violations of regulatory statutes;
(3) expenses of defending against claims of colorable tortious business
activities; (4) expenses of legal but ethically questionable business
activities.
Expenses of Defending Against Charges
of Criminal Business Activities
Formerly all expenses of a business, criminal per se, were dis-
allowed except the cost of goods sold.' Recently, however, deduc-
tions have been allowed for the "legitimate expenses . . . [of] ille-
123. Id. at 97 (italics added).
124. "We voice no approval of the business ethics or public policy involved in the
payments now before us. We recognize the province of legislatures to translate
progressive standards of professional conduct into law. . . ." Id. at 97 (italics
added). See Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary to Public Policy: An Evaluatio
of thw Lilly Case, 8 TAx L. Rnv. 241, 248 (1953).
125. Andrew Kjar, P-H 1941 BTA MEm. DEc. 141,446 (1941) (bootlegging).
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gitimate business" if the expenses themselves directly produce income,1
6
but attorneys' fees paid "to perpetuate or to assure the continuance of an
illegal business" are nondeductible. 2 7  Where there has been a criminal
conviction,'S even though an appeal is pending,2 9 or a compromise
of criminal charges where violation is admitted, 3 ' the attorneys' fees
incurred in the defense have been treated no differently than fines or
penalties levied as punishment,' 3 ' and held nondeductible. Although
one can see the force of the argument disallowing fines-if deductible
this would serve to mitigate the prescribed punishment 132 -it is dif-
ficult to conceive of a public policy aimed at deterring persons from
making a good-faith defense against criminal prosecutions.'
After Heininger, fees incurred in unsuccessful defenses would con-
tinue to be nondeductible in cases where "personal punishment" was
sought under criminal statutes. When "personal punishment" is given
its ordinary meaning, i.e., punishment against the person of the offender
and not his pocketbook," then a different result may well obtain where
only a fine is, or could have been, sought as punishment.3 5 Shortly
after Heininger, the Treasury issued a G. C. M."'m allowing a corpora-
126. Cohen v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 176 F.2d 394, 400 (10th Cir. 1949)
(bookies' salaries).
127. Anthony C. Stralla, 9 T.C. 801, 821 (1947) (gambling ship). The Stralla,
case has been criticized on the ground that the Sixth Amendment establishes a para-
mount public policy that all criminals shall enjoy the right to have the assistance
of counsel for their defense. Krassner, Can a Deduction for Legal Fees Be Against
Public Policy?, 26 TAXES 447, 448 (1948).
128. E.g., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 47 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1931).
129. Joseph Cohen, 2 CCH TC MEM. Dc. 602 (1943).
130. Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943);
cf. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th
Cir. 1945) (penalties only imposed under civil antitrust sections were at issue, since
the Commissioner did not appeal the Tax Court's allowance of a deduction for the
attorney's fees, 3 T.C. 310 (1944)). But cf. Greene Motor Company, 5 T.C. 314
(1945). The majority of the Tax Court in Greene Motor felt that Heininger is in-
consistent with Superior Wines, id. at 321-22, while two dissenting judges thought
that Heininger approved it, id. at 323 n.2.
131. See Note, 54 HARV. L. Ray. 852, 853, 855-56 (1941). But cf. Jerry Ross-
man Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
132. Compare view expressed in Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1945), with Lurie, Deductibility of "Illegal"
Expenses, 11 ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION, 1189, 1190-91 (1953).
133. But cf. Judge Learned Hand's argument for denial of attorneys' fees in
Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949),
which overlooks the Heininger requirement of a good-faith defense. See Note, 51
COL. L. REv. 752, 757 (1951).
134. Cf. Greene Motor Co., 5 T.C. 310, 318 (1945).
135. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 681, § 21 (Purdon 1954) (anthracite strip mining
without a permit is a misdemeanor subject only to maximum fine of $5000); MAss.
ANN. LAWS c. 143, § 23 (Supp. 1953) (obstructing stairways in buildings subject
only to fine up to $500).
136. G.C.M. 24377, 1944 Cumr. BULL. 93. This G.C.M. came on the heels of
Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310 (1944), acq., 1944 Cum. BULL. 18,
allowing the deduction of attorneys' fees incurred in a compromise of a suit for
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tion to deduct its legal expenses in defending a suit brought against it
under the Sherman Act '3 7 in which it was found guilty. Although the rul-
ing does not seem to have been compelled under strict Heininger rea-
soning, the Treasury apparently did not choose to limit the deduction of
attorneys' fees to antitrust cases where only civil remedies were sought.
In determining the status of fees incurred in an unsuccessful de-
fense against disbarment proceedings, a pre-Heininger Tax Court de-
cision held that since disbarment is "for the present purposes .
affected by the same considerations" as a criminal prosecution the fees
are nondeductible." This decision is now questionable, as disbarment
is not legislative (Lilly) and the precise policy of this action is to pro-
tect the public and not to impose personal punishment (Heininger).
Where the defense against criminal charges is successful, 139 or the
criminal chargds are compromised and a violation is not admitted,
140
the fees are deductible. In a very recent decision, the Tax Court per-
mitted the deductions of fees of the attorneys whose services on the
case terminated before a tax fraud indictment was returned, even
though the taxpayer was subsequently convicted. 4' Of course the ac-
tivities must also meet the requirement of being proximately related to
the taxpayer's business."
Expenses of Defending Against Charges
of Violation of Regulatory Statutes
Where the taxpayer has been held to have violated a regulatory
statute-i.e., one which provides only a money penalty and/or injunc-
tive relief-the attorneys' fees incurred in a good-faith defense of the
charges should be deductible. Coming within this factual situation are
the cases, like Heininger, dealing with the fees of an unsuccessful de-
civil antitrust penalties. The ruling was based solely on the grounds that a good-faith
defense against antitrust charges is as necessary to a business as the attack on the
mail fraud order was in Heininger; it did not consider the second part of the Hein-
inger test- whether allowance of the expense would frustrate public policy. Guilt
under the Sherman Act falls squarely within the Lilly (legislative policy) and
Heininger ("personal punishment") conception of nondeductible activity. The Sher-
man Act does provide for personal punishment, although incapable of being executed
upon a corporation. See generally, Smith, Deductions by Corporations of Expense of
Litigation in their Defense of Alleged Anti-Trust Violations, 8 ANN. INST. ON FED.
TAXATION 646 (1950).
137. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(Cum. Supp. 1953).
138. Louis S. Levy, 1 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 226 (1942). See also Tinkoff v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 120 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941); G.C.M. 23438, 1942-2
Cu-m. BULL. 188.
139. E.g., Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F.2d
187 (3d Cir. 1932).
140. Greene Motor Company, 5 T.C. 314 (1945), acq., 1945 Cu.m. BULL. 3. See
note 130 supra.
141. Hymie Schwartz, 22 T.C. No. 91 (1954).
142. See 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 385-86 and n.10.
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fense against statutory charges where only injunctive relief is sought.'3
As the Treasury permits the deduction of fees, at least for corporate
defendants, where criminal guilt under the Sherman Act 144 is estab-
lished, to be consistent the Commissioner should not question the de-
ductibility of fees when only injunctive remedies are sought and im-
posed for antitrust violations.1
45
Where regulatory statutes provide for a monetary exaction from
a taxpayer in the nature of a penalty, many cases have denied deduc-
tibility to the penalties '" but, again reasoning a fortiori from the
Treasury's position on fees of criminal antitrust violations, the fees
incurred in defense of the penalties should be deductible. In Longhorn
Portland Cement Co.,"4 the Tax Court allowed the fees incurred in a
compromise of a non-criminal antitrust prosecution where, although the
defendant did not admit to a violation, large penalties were assessed.
The Treasury has also allowed the deduction of fees connected with an
unsuccessful defense of civil sections of OPA regulations where treble
damages are provided. 4 s Heininger, although not concerned with a
statute providing monetary penalties, is helpful on this issue in the re-
spect that it warns that an administrative finding of guilt in quasi-
criminal cases is not to be a "rigid criterion" in determining deduc-
tibility of attorneys' fees. 149  If, therefore, an exaction is held to be a
penalty but not one which, by its deduction, would frustrate public
policy and is consequently deductible itself,'" a fortiori legal fees as-
sociated with the litigation should be deductible. Of course, if the
exaction is not considered a penalty but restitutionary in nature and
therefore deductible,' the legal fees incurred in the defense should re-
ceive similar treatment.
Expenses in Defense of Colorable Tortious Activities
It had long been held that costs of defending against suits by
private parties for fraud, breach of corporate fiduciary duty, malpractice,
143. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §440 (Purdon Supp. 1953) (revocation of
real estate operator's license for misleading or untruthful advertising) ; MASS. ANN.
LAWS c. 175, § 193A (1948) (enjoining insurance companies from issuing policies).
144. See text at note 136 supra.
145. This means that National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering,
89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) should be considered overruled.
146. See note 131 supra.
147. 3 T.C. 310 (1944), other iss-es appealed and rev'd, 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1945).
148. G.C.M. 24810 1946-1 Cum. Bur. 55.
149. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
150. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.
1949) (question three).
151. Id. (question one).
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negligence and patent infringements are deductible even though unsuc-
cessful. 152 Where an executor or trustee has settled charges of mis-
management of estate property, the deductibility of legal fees incurred
in the controversy depends on whether the taxpayer can be considered
engaged in business." 3 If not so engaged, deductions have not been
permitted as a non-business expense 154 on the grounds that this would
subsidize delinquent trustees. As deductions have been permitted
where the taxpayer has been convicted of criminal activities and where
regulatory statutes have been violated, the nondeductibility of these fees
arising out of tort charges seems unrealistic.
Expenses of Legal But Ethically Questionable Business Activities
Contrasted with the preceding categories, here are involved pay-
ments to attorneys for services not connected with actual or possible
litigation, services of a nature that could also be performed by non-
lawyers. Therefore, the decisions dealing with payments to non-
lawyers are precedents for fees paid to attorneys for similar services.
Although no statute has been violated, courts have denied deduc-
tibility to payments for influence and favorable consideration in secur-
ing contracts for the taxpayer. 55 This policy does not extend to a
lawyer's legitimate efforts to get contracts for his clients, even though
he is well acquainted with the proper contracting officers., 6
The status of fees for lobbying activities not violative of any stat-
ute presents an interesting question. The regulations have consistently
denied deductibility for such payments "I and the Supreme Court in
Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue'58
held that the regulations were determinative of the question in disal-
lowing payments made to publicists and lawyers where the taxpayer
was attempting to secure favorable legislation not for its own business
but for the interests of others on a contingent fee basis. Previous to
Textile Mills, in'cases dealing with lobbying expenses designed to bene-
fit the taxpayer's own business, and not incurred on a contingent fee
basis, the Board of Tax Appeals took the position that where "the
152. For collection of cases, see Note, 54 HAXv. L. Rsv. 852, 856 (1941).
153. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Macy, 2d Cir., Sept. 21, 1954. For more com-
plete discussion of this problem, see text at note 217 infra.
154. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948); Com-
missioner of Int. Rev. v. Josephs, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 194).
155. For collection of cases, see Note, 51 CoL. L. Rsv. 752, 759-60 (1951).
156. Aetna-Standard Engineering Co., 15 T.C. 284 (1950); Alexandria Gravel
Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 95 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938).
157. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (g) -1 (a) (1953). For history of the regula-
tions, see Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 314 U.S. 326
(1941).
158. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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means or methods employed are legitimate" ' and not "something
sinister," 10 the expenses were deductible. The Ninth Circuit in
Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 181 overruled
one of these decisions, relying wholly on the effect of the regulations.
At first glance, this case would appear to be just a forerunner to Tex-
tile Mills, but the Court there did not even mention Sunset Scavenger,
strange indeed since the reasoning was so parallel. It is reasonable to
assume that, since the lobbying expenses in Sunset Scavenger and
Textile Mills were radically different, this omission was not uninten-
tional and, therefore, the Court did not intend to preclude the deduc-
tibility of all types of lobbying expenses. Support for this opinion is
found in the Lilly case where, in discussing Textile Mills, the Court
pointed out that that decision disallowed only "some types" of lobby-
ing expenses.""
Applying the Heininger and Lilly tests, it is rather doubtful that
the "influence" cases would be changed; it is difficult to imagine any
court saying that it is ordinary and necessary for a business to secure
contracts by buying influence, and part two of the Heininger test-the
frustration question-may never be reached. This is not so with
lobbying expenses; it is just as normal to attempt to save a business
threatened with extinction or harm by adverse legislation as by a mail
fraud order. On the public policy question, disallowance of lobbying
expenses perhaps meets the Lilly test if the regulations be considered a
''governmental declaration" of a legislative character by reenactment,
but, as we are not considering here activities prohibited by statutes, the
"personal punishment" factor of Heininger cannot be present. There-
fore, it cannot be said that these two cases dictate any one result and it
would appear that deductibility of lobbying expenses depends on the
willingness of courts to distinguish the Textile Mills case.
DEFENSE OF TITLE
"Expenditures incurred in defending or perfecting title to prop-
erty . . . constitute a part of the cost of the property and are not de-
ductible expenses." 3 This, or almost identical language, has ap-
peared in the regulations since 1919.0 From nearly the beginning
159. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 18 B.T.A. 168, 179 (1929).
160. Sunset Scavenger Co., 31 B.T.A. 758, 763 (1934). Also, Lucas v. Wofford,
49 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1931), affirming 15 B.T.A. 1225 (1929).
161. 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936).
162. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 95 (1952). Cf. Note, 67 HARV. L. Rsv.
1408, 1414 (1954).
163. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(k) (1953).
164. U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 293 (1920 ed. 1921); U.S. Treas. Reg. 62,
Art. 293 (1922); U.S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 292 (1924) (Rev. Act 1924); U.S.
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of the income tax, the "defense of title" doctrine has limited the deduc-
tion for business expenses.
In 1920 "6 and 1921,1"6 Bureau rulings refused to allow the de-
duction of attorneys' fees for defending or quieting title either as a
loss or as an expense. The doctrine was extended in 1922 to include
the costs of defending against any threat to the value of the property,
even though title was not directly in issue. 167  In the next year the
costs of recovering property were placed in the same nondeductible
category.
1 8
The Board of Tax Appeals went along with broadening of the
doctrine by disallowing the expense of a defense against a Govern-
ment suit to prevent the owner from taking oil from its wells.'0 9 It was
then an easy judicial jump to disallow practically all the expenses of
litigation involving oil royalties.
7
1
In disallowing expenses of litigation involving patent royalties,
the Treasury met a temporary hurdle in its own regulations x71 which
stated specifically (and still do 172) what entered into the "cost" of a
patent. In 1920 the Committee on Appeals and Review of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue reasoned that attorney's fees for defending a pat-
ent after its issue were fully deductible because they did not prolong
its life; they were not an "improvement or betterment"; and they were
not recoverable through depreciation based on its "cost" as defined in
the regulations.'73 By 1947 this early ruling had been forgotten, though
not revoked or modified, and is not even mentioned in a case holding
Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 292 (1926) (Rev. Act 1926); U.S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 282
(1929) (Rev. Act 1928); U.S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 282 (1933) (Rev. Act 1932);
U.S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 24-2 (1936) (Rev. Act 1936); U.S. Treas. Reg. 101,
Art. 24-2 (1939) (Rev. Act 1938); U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.24-2 (1940); 'U.S.
Treas. Reg. 111, §29.24-2 (1943).
165. A.R.R. 284, 3 Cum. BULL. 208 (1920).
166. A.R.R. 701, 5 Cum. BULL. 176 (1921).
167. I.T. 1382, 1-2 Cum. BULL. 146 (1922).
168. A.R.R. 2318, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 82 (1923). While this ruling dealt with
costs of recovering property in kind from the Alien Property Custodian, an earlier
ruling, O.D. 1048, 5 Cum. BULL. 127 (1921), involved the proceeds if the property
had been sold. Under Agnes Pyne Coke, 17 T.C. 403 (1951), aff'd, 201 F.2d 742
(5th Cir. 1953), the fee might be deductible in full if the A.P.C. has sold the
property.
169. Consolidated Mutual Oil Co., 2 B.T.A. 1067 (1925); cf. North American
Oil Consolidated, 12 B.T.A. 68 (1928).
170. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1932); Blackwell Oil &
Gas Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 60 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1932); Moynier v.
Welch, 97 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1938); Manhattan Land & Fruit Co., 1 CCH TC
MEat. DEc. 217 (1942); Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 7 T.C. 685 (1946), aff'd, 165
F.2d 933 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 833 (1948).
171. U.S. Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 174 (1918).
172. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(1)-7 (1953).
173. A.RR. 98, 2 Cum. BULL. 105, 107 (1920).
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that the costs of defending the exclusive right to make, use and sell
under a patent are not deductible.'
Although in 1928 the Supreme Court was "unable to perceive
any real distinction between an expenditure for attorneys' fees made
to secure payment of the earnings of the business and a like expenditure
to retain such earnings after their receipt," 175 in a royalty case the
Tax Court176 limited the "earnings of business" language to specific
earnings rather than including fees for litigation claiming all earnings
from a patent or agreement. In an important recent decision, the Third
Circuit has at long last heeded the twenty-six year old language of the
Supreme Court and bluntly stated that in litigation over patent royal-
ties validity of the patent is normally called into question, but that fact
does not make the attorney's fees any less deductible as ordinary busi-
ness expenses.'
77
Following the long administrative policy of curtailment of allow-
able business expense deductions, the Bureau, promptly after the 1942
amendments to the Code, inserted the defense of title limitation in the
regulations on these amendments 178 which allowed a deduction of the
expenses of producing income, or of managing, conserving, or main-
taining property held for the production of income. The draftsmen
of these regulations must have felt its repetition necessary, because, as
administratively overexpanded, the defense of title doctrine is nowhere
spelled out in the Code and is so contradictory to the specific deduc-
tion allowed for "expenses . . . for the . . . conservation or
maintenance of property." 171
174. Safety Tube Corp., 8 T.C. 757 (1947), aft'd, 168 F2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948).
But cf. Urquhart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954), reversing
20 T.C. 944 (1953), discussed in note 177 inf ra.
175. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
176. Safety Tube Corp., 8 T.C. 757 (1947).
177. Urquhart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954), re-
versing 20 T.C. 944 (1953). Note that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
overlooks the demurrer in Safety Tube, supra note 174, which removed the issue of
"title" and left the litigation a matter of who owned the royalties.
178. U.S. Treas. Reg 103, § 19.23(a)-15, added by T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum.
BULL. 96, 99-100; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (a) -15 (b) (1943) ; U.S. Treas. Reg.
118, §39.23(a)-15(h) (1953).
179. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (2); I.R.C. § 212(2). To date the limita-
tion in the non-business regulations, U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a) -15(k) (1953)
contains a parenthetical exception which seems to have passed completely without
judicial interpfetation. It provides, "Expenditures incurred . . . in recovering
property (other than investment property and amounts of income which, if and when
recovered, must be included in income) . . . constitute a part of the cost of the
property and are not deductible expenses." As amounts "which . . . must be in-
cluded in income" are "amounts of income," the only grammatical interpretation is
that expenses of recovering "investment property" are not part of its cost but are
deductible currently. This is consistent with allowing a receiver to deduct his
legal expenses incurred in recovering an overpayment by the company to its attorney,
notwithstanding the Commissioner's objection that "title" to the fund was in issue.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 3 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 15 (1944).
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The administrative transposition of the defense of title limitation
from business to non-business expenses was soon judicially perpetuated.
Although a district court pointed to the new section in the Code and
justified the deduction of the costs of successfully defending a suit to in-
validate the taxpayer' spurchase of corporate stock,' the circuit
court 's' found, in the legislative history 182 and in the regulations,"'
that:
"A deduction under this section is subject to all the restric-
tions and limitations that apply in the case of the deduction
of an expense paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness."
Thus administrative custom circumscribed broad statutory language.
Thereafter the rule was extended not only to fees paid in the de-
fense of actual will contests,'8 4 but also to the mere taking of a deposi-
tion when there was a suspicion of such a contest.8 5 Here the appli-
cation of the rule raises a practical problem for which there is no satis-
factory answer. Such suits are usually brought against the beneficiary
who takes the bulk or residue of an estate, consisting of stocks and
bonds, many with an established market value at death which under
the Code will become their "basis," ' and perhaps a variety of assets
in an unincorporated business .117  It is difficult to believe that the
judges who denied the deduction gave much thought to how the tax-
payer was to go about breaking up his litigation expenses among the
various items of property involved and adding them to their respective
costs. Moreover, in the case where the property has an established
market value, the addition of such expenses to "cost" merely forces
up the basis artificially"-since the value on the market in no way is af-
fected-and creates a fictitious "capital loss," which may never be
deductible.
180. Lumpkin v. Bowers, 50 F. Supp. 874 (E.D.S.C. 1943).
181. Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F.2d 927 (4th Cir.), cert. denaied, 322 U.S. 755
(1944).
182. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL
372, 430; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
504, 571.
183. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 (a) -15, added by T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
96, 99-100; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.23(a)-15(k) (1953).
184. U.S Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b)(1943); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§39.23(a)-15(k)(1953). Irene D. Addison, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 644 (1948),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1949).
185. James C. Coughlin, 3 T.C. 420 (1944).
186. I.R.C. § 1014.
187. See James C. Coughlin, 3 T.C. 420 (1944).
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There have been hopeful suggestions that there are exceptions to
the "defense of title" rule.' 8 The three mentioned were the cases in
which the "title" defended was (a) to property acquired as income,
(b) involved in a mere nuisance suit, or (c) incidental to or involved
only as a consequence of other allegations. These exceptions have nar-
row limits.
The cases involving title to income are limited to the defense or
recovery of specific items,'8 9 and do not extend to income, such as
royalties, for an indefinite period. 9
The idea that expenses of settling mere nuisance suits are deduc-
tible stems from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Levitt & Sons, Inc.
v. Nunan.'9 ' The rule there established is worthy, if a bit narrow, in
the settlement experience of most lawyers. Judge Hand would allow
the deduction of the costs of a settlement, including attorney's fees,
even if a claim to title had been made by the plaintiff, if all three of the
following tests were met: (1) the taxpayer is "entirely confident that
any suit which . . . [the plaintiff] might bring could not succeed,"
and (2) the taxpayer makes "the payment in question only for the
purpose of avoiding the damage to its credit, its reputation, and its
business generally which might result from such a suit," and (3)
it * any such fear which it may have had, [was] so far justified
that a reasonable person in its place would have thought a settlement
at that figure less than the damage which would follow from such a
suit." 192
In several cases the taxpayer has tried to meet this test. None has
succeeded,' 9 3 including the taxpayer in the Levitt case.'9 4 The deduc-
tion has been denied where the testimony showed, probably to his em-
barrassment, that the settlement was made only after counsel had ad-
188. Everett, Deductibility of Legal and Accounting Fees, 6 ANN. INST. FED.
TAXATION 616, 628-33 (1948).
189. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (stock received as a
fee); O'Day Investment Co., 13 B.T.A. 1230 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 34
(1929) (defense to accounting in receivership action); Udolpho Wolfe Co., 15
B.T.A. 485, acq., VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 57 (1929) (unsuccessful action to recover
excessive compensation paid in prior year) ; Bula E. Croker, 27 B.T.A. 588 (1933)
(expense of suing an agent for sale of lands and collection of interest); Pierce
Estates, Inc., 3 T.C. 875 (1944), nonacq., 1944 Cum. BULL. 51 (claim to royalties
under words used in oil and gas contract).
190. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 7 T.C. 685 (1946), aff'd, 165 F.2d 933 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 833 (1948); Safety Tube Corp., 8 T.C. 757 (1947),
aff'd, 168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948) See text at note 176 supra.
191. 142 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1944).
192. Id. at 798.
193. Condenser Service & Engineering Co., 10 CCH TC Msma. DEc. 911 (1951),
aft'd, 200 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1953) (over $478,000 claim settled for $97,500) ; E. W.
Brown, Jr., 19 T.C. 87 (1952) (settled for less than 1/6th of claim).
194. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 2 CCH TC Mf-. DEC. 127 (1943), rev'd and remanded,
142 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1944) ; 5 T.C. 913 (1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1947).
DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS" FEES
vised that the amount paid would be deductible under these require-
ments.195 The Tax Court has held that settling a will contest for less
than one-sixth of the increase the contestant demanded could not qualify
as settling a nuisance suit.196
The most successful counter-measure to a claim that an expense
was in defense of title is to show that, while title may have come up, it
was purely incidental to the main issue,19 7 or to the capacity in which
the taxpayer was sued-for example, that he was sued for malfeasance
as an officer or director and that therefore title to the stock acquired in
breach of duty was only a matter of remedy "9S-or better still that it
was not the taxpayer's title which was in issue.'99 But the issue of
title does not become merely incidental when it is successfully eliminated
as an issue on demurrer at the beginning of the litigation which con-
tinues bitterly as a suit for accounting for royalties.200
As applied in many of these cases, the rule has aroused deserved
disrepute. The American Law Institute recommends that it be modi-
fied "to permit an expense deduction where nothing is accomplished
beyond preservation of an existing title." 201
The defense of title rule is unwarranted because often the expense,
though necessary, adds nothing to the value of the property. The
Code disallows only ". . . any amount paid out . . . to increase
the value of any property or estate." 202 Only rarely does the Treas-
ury or a court recognize that the cost of litigation is deductible because
it has not increased the value of the property involved.20 a
Moreover, the true test should be an increase over value at the
time the instant taxpayer obtained the property, not an increase in the
195. Condenser Service & Engineering Co., Inc., 10 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 911, 915
(1951), aft'd, 200 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1953).
196. E. W. Brown, Jr., 19 T.C. 87 (1952).
197. William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T.C. 218 (1948) (primary problem com-
pensating an employee); Hochschild v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 161 F.2d 817
(2d Cir. 1947) (primary charge corporate breach of trust) ; Rassenfoss v. Commis-
sioner of Int. Rev., 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946) (primary charge partnership
accounting) ; Heller v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945) (primary claim for cash value of dissenters' shares in
merger); General Pencil Co., 3 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 603 (1944) (primary effort to
end ex-president's troublemaking).
198. Hochschild v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947),
reversing 7 T.C. 81 (1946).
199. Cooper Foundation, 13 T.C. 209 (1949).
200. Safety Tube Corp., 8 T.C. 757 (1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948);
but. see Urquhart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954).
201. 1 AmImcAN LAW INSTiTuTE, FEDERAL. INcomE TAx STATUTE 285, § X166 (a),
comment (Feb. 1954 Draft).
202. I.R.C. § 263 (a) (1) (italics added).
203. A.R.R. 98, 2 Cum. BULL. 105 (1920); Reaklrt v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 29 B.T.A. 1296 (1934), aff'd without opinion, 84 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1936);
Bliss v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 57 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1932), before being over-
ruled by Jones' Estate v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 127 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1942).
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value over what it would have been had the contest not been made.204
In the case of patents, or lands which subsequently prove valuable, the
claims may be made many years after the title has been reasonably
established and perfected, and are often in the nature of strike suits.
It is not impossible to draw the necessary line between "capital" and
"expense" items. The line is the same and constantly drawn between
physical repairs and capital improvements.
TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES
If your fee has not fallen into one or more of the preceding six
nondeductible categories, you may well find justification enough for a
deduction in the two sections of the 1954 Code and the prior decisions
next considered.
Individuals
The individual carrying on any trade or business can deduct a
reasonable amount for legal services actually rendered to the busi-
ness.205 When a connection between the legal services and the business
was shown, the Tax Court allowed a deduction for fees for counselling
a witness before a congressional hearing 2 6 and an author regarding
"literary affairs." 207 An employee may deduct the cost of legal advice
on his rights under an employment contract.
208
The cost to an individual of bringing 2 0 or defending 210 a suit
for an accounting for partnership income, profits, or property is fully
deductible; costs of such an action cannot be capitalized.211 A lawyer
or doctor may deduct his costs of defending a suit for damages arising
from the profession brought by a client or patient.2" Similarly, a
corporate officer's costs of defending a suit to oust him, 213 or charging
204. Cf. 1 AMERIcAN LAW INsTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE 285,
§X166(a), comment (Feb. 1954 draft).
205. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1).
206. Waldo Salt, 18 T.C. 182 (1952), acq., 1952-2 CuM. BuLL. 3.
207. Pelham G. Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637 (1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
208. Arthur N. Blum, 11 T.C. 101 (1948), aff'd, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950),
acq., 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 1.
209. Cf. Orien H. Anderson, 8 CCH TC M~m. DEC. 740 (1949).
210. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Rassenfoss v. Com-
missioner of Int. Rev., 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946); Andrew Siarto, 6 CCH TC
MEM. DEC. 3 (1947), aff'd, Siarto v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 171 F.2d 293 (6th
Cir. 1948); Marsh v. Squire, 1 CCH 1948 TAX CT. REP. 19142 (W.D. Wash.
1947).
211. Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc., 12 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 786
(1953).
212. S.M. 4078, V-1 Cum. BuLL. 226 (1926).
213. E. L. Potter, 20 B.T.A. 252 (1930), nonacq., X-1 CuM. BULL. 90 (1931).
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mismanagement, 21 4 breach of fiduciary duties, 215 or misappropriation
of funds 210 are fully deductible.
If an individual's activities as an executor or trustee are sufficient
in scope and duration so that he is considered to be in business in such
capacities, in settling mismanagement charges not only his legal ex-
penses but the amount paid in settlement are deductible. 217  In the
very recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Macy,218 the
Second Circuit held that a person can be in the business of being an
executor or trustee even if his duties concern only one estate or trust.
If a trustee cannot so qualify, he does not fare so well. In two circuit
court decisions, neither his legal costs nor the settlement payments
were allowed on the grounds that this would be subsidizing delinquent
fiduciaries. 1 ' These decisions seem unrealistic on the public policy
grounds 220 and the Macy case casts additional doubts on their present
validity.
Corporations
Where the corporation has paid the litigation expenses of its of-
ficers or directors in suits brought against them, the corporation has
been allowed to deduct such expenses, or a part of them, when it has
received a benefit or had a legal obligation to pay them. In the bene-
fit cases the Tax Court tends to bear heavily on the taxpayer, allocating
only a small proportion of the fee to the corporate benefit.2 ' Where
the litigation arose over the terms of a pledge of stock belonging to
one of its officers but used to secure corporate borrowing, the corpora-
tion was allowed to deduct the full amount of the legal fees. 2
A provision in the corporate by-laws providing indemnification
to directors and officers for expenses in the defense of suits arising out
of having been a director or an officer helps to assure a deduction to
214. Dixon Fagerberg, P-H 1942 BTA-TC MEm. DEC. 42,091 (1942) (un-
authorized corporate speculation).
215. William L. Butler, 17 T.C. 675 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 1 (wife
profited from insider information); Hochschild v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 161
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1947) (officers' shares in profitable corporate purchase).
216. Mrs. A. B. Hurt et al., Executors, 30 B.T.A. 653 (1934), remnded o
compromise, 90 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1937).
217. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Macy, 215 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1954); John
Abbott, 38 B.T.A. 1290 (1938).
218. 215 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1954).
219. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948); Commis-
sioner of Int. Rev. v. Josephs, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948).
220. See text at note 154 supra.
221. Davis B. Thornton, 4 CCH TC MIma. DEc. 29 (1945) ; Standard Galvanizing
Co., 11 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 170 (1952), rev'd, 202 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1953).
222. Standard Galvanizing Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 202 F.2d 736 (7th
Cir. 1953).
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the corporation.2" With such a provision in the by-laws, the Tax
Court in the recent Union Investment Co. case has allowed the corpora-
tion to deduct the expense of successfully defending an officer against
a criminal charge of conspiring to influence legislation, a decision that
received the Commissioner's acquiescence.224 An earlier Treasury rul-
ing took the position that, where the defense has not been successful,
expense to defend its officers is not a corporate deduction under the
rationale that the payment is the expense of another.225  This position
does not seem realistic, since such indemnity may well be a fringe bene-
fit necessary to induce officers and directors to serve, deductible in any
event to the corporation as reasonable compensation,226 and the ac-
quiescence in the Union Investment case seems to indicate a change in
result.
Where the title to property is not primarily involved, the corpora-
tion may deduct the cost of defending actions brought directly against
it, such as for violation of the antitrust laws 227 or Office of Price Ad-
ministration ceilings,22 for Securities and Exchange Commission in-
vestigations and stockholders' suits incidental thereto, 29 to declare it
bankrupt,230 to restrain the holding of the annual meeting,23' for dam-
ages for acquiring assets by fraud at an inadequate price,2 32 or for
damages caused by the negligence of its employees.
23 3
The legal costs of planning for corporate extinction, 23 4 but not
contraction,235 are deductible in full. An equivalent deduction as a
loss236 arises when corporate plans of recapitalization,2 s7 merger, 2 8 or
223. Union Investment Company, 21 T.C. No. 74 (1954); Smith, Deductions
by Corporations of Expenses of Litigation in Their Defense of Alleged Anti-Trust
Violations, 8 ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 646-55, esp. 651-53 (1950).
224. Union Investment Company, 21 T.C. No. 74 (1954), acq., Cum. BuLL.
No. 27, p. 4 (July 6, 1954).
225. G.C.M. 24377, 1944 CuM. BuLL. 93.
226. Smith, supra note 223, at 653, suggests other limits on the apparently broad
disallowance in this ruling.
227. See text at note 147 supra.
228. See text at note 148 supra.
229. Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 886 (D. Conn. 1948).
230. Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc., 12 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 786
(1953); Hendrick Ranch Royalties, Inc., 1 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 794 (1943).
231. Hendrick Ranch Royalties, Inc., 1 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 794 (1943).
232. American Factors, Ltd. v. Kanne, 100 F. Supp. 329 (D. Hawaii 1951),
on remand from 190 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1951); Matson Navigation Co., 24 B.T.A.
14 (1931).
233. O.D. 1117, 5 Cum. BULL. 121 (1921).
234. See text at note 69 supra.
235. See text at note 75 supra. Cf. Tobacco Products Export Corp., 18 T.C.
1100 (1952) (held: portion of expenses of a partial liquidation attributable to the
distribution of corporate assets is deductible).
236. I.R.C. § 165.
237. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 15 T.C. 106 (1950).
238. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 30 B.T.A. 973 (1934), aff'd on other grounds, 80
F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1935); Portland Furniture Mfg. Co., 30 B.T.A. 878 (1934),
nonacq., XIII-2 Cum. BULL. 33 (1934).
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liquidation 29 are abandoned. The Tax Court has held that it is an
ordinary and necessary corporate expense to investigate the tax ad-
vantages of operating as a personal service corporation or as a partner-
ship,240 but not so to look into the economic advantages of a separate
corporation to purchase liquor inventory outside the state.241
Both for individuals and for corporations, the Tax Court has al-
lowed a full deduction for relatively small fees for routine work in con-
nection with the business. 242  In these cases, however, there was no
indication that any of the service was for nondeductible items. Where
such service is involved, the attorney who does not separately record
his time and charges subjects his client to the risk of losing the deduc-
tion which might be allowable, since there is no assurance a lump sum
fee will be allocated, 243 and at least puts him to extra argument and pos-
sible litigation to justify the deduction of part of the fee.244
INVESTMENT AND TAX E XPENSES
For individuals, and estates, trusts, and partnerships, the 1954
Code 2 45 provides a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses
"(1) for the production or collection of income; (2) for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the produc-
tion of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection,
or refund of any tax." The first two items are carried over verbatim
from the 1939 Code as amended in 1942; 246 the language of the third
is wholly new,2 47 but the substance only partly so.
239. Tobacco Prodcts Export Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952).
240. Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc., 20 T.C. 790 (1953).
241. Helms, Inc., 9 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 1116 (1950). This decision seems
to be in hopeless conflict with the later Meldrum case, supra note 240, and should
be considered overruled.
242. San Marco Shop, Inc., 12 CCH TC MEl. DEC., 843 (1953) ("general
counsel," although no fee charged for incorporation); Tennessee Valley Leather
Co., 8 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 396 (1949) ($500 to attorney "regularly retained");
George Sylvester Viereck, 4 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1026 (1945) ($4700 "for services
rendered . . . in connection with his business"); Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
3 CCH TC Mam. DEC. 15 (1944) (ordinary corporate work, corporate reports,
meetings of directors, advice to officers and directors on matters generally).
243. Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949) ; Sayers F. Harman, 4 T.C. 335 (1944);
Arthur Jordan, 12 B.T.A. 423 (1928). See generally the section on Allocation,
infra following note 351.
244. Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332 (1953); Saks & Co., 20 B.T.A. 1151 (1930),
noiacq., X-1 Cum. BuLL. 92 (1931).
245. I.R.C. § 212.
246. INT. REv. CODE or 1939, § 23(a) (2), as amended, Revenue Act of 1942,
§ 121, 56 STAT. 819 (1942).
247. See SEN. REiP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 218 (1954); H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A. 59 (1954).
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Both the 1942 and the 1954 changes reverse victories248 won by
the Commissioner in the Supreme Court. In 1941 the Court held
that the management of investments could not constitute a "trade or
business" and that, therefore, the expenses of managing securities were
not deductible.249 Congress responded in 1942 by creating a deduc-
tion for investment expenses. In 1952 the Court denied a deduction
for the legal costs of contesting a gift tax deficiency,25° but, since in-
come and estate tax litigation costs were deductible, Congress felt it
equitable to create a deduction for such costs in connection with "any
tax," including federal, state, county or municipal, income, estate, gift,
and property.
251
The expenses deductible under the first two paragraphs of Section
212 do not have to be matched to specific items of annual income.
"Income" for this section includes income which may have been re-
ceived in prior years or may come in future years. 52  The income
need not be recurring; gain on the sale of a single property is in-
cluded. 53 If a property is held for investment, the expense of manag-
ing or conserving it is fully deductible, "even though there is no like-
lihood that the property will be sold at a profit or will otherwise be
productive of income,254 and even though the property is held merely
to minimize a loss with respect thereto." 255 While .this is a broad
concept of "income," the income must belong to the taxpayer who
claims the deduction 250 and, although the time of realization of the
income may be remote, the taxpayer must expect to realize it for him-
self or in the capacity in which he acts.
248. Higgins v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (although a
change had been recommended as early as 1938; see Brodsky and McKibben,
Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAX L. Rxv. 39, 40 et seq.
(1946)); and Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
249. Higgins v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
250. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
251. I.R.C. § 212(3), 69. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 218
(1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A 59 (1954).
252. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §3923(a)-15(b); U.S. Treas. 111, §29.23(a)-15(a);
T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Ctum. BuLu. 96, 98; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
87 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 504, 570-71; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 372, 429.
253. See note 252 supra.
254. See note 252 supra.
255. See note 252 supra, except for H.R. REP. No. 2333.
256. Frederic A. Seidler, 18 T.C. 256, 261 (1952) (cost of unsuccessful effort
by trustee and sole remainderman to continue $200,000 trust: "Since the property
interest was not held by the petitioner for the production of income for himself,
petitioner must be denied deduction of the expenses incurred."); Dorothy E. Law,
12 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 1440 (1953). These cases would seem to distinguish be-
tween §212(1)-allowing expenses of producing income in the distant future, and
§212(2)-not allowing expenses of management and conservation of property held
by the taxpayer currently for another, but which in the future would produce income
for the taxpayer himself,
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The broad scope of the deductions permitted under Section 212 is
not attributable solely to Congress. The Supreme Court, in 1945,257
cut short the narrow construction imposed by the original Treasury
regulations 258 and lower court decisions.259 Under these regulations
the Treasury had attempted to restrict the deduction of the expenses
for tax advice and those of executors, administrators, and receivers.2 60
From December 1942, when the regulations were issued, until 1945,
when the Supreme Court decided Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,261 many courts went along with the regulations, par-
ticularly in respect of fees for income tax matters.262 In the Bingham
case, the Court held fully deductible a $16,400 fee for unsuccessfully
contesting an income tax deficiency asserted against the trust, an $800
fee in connection with the payment of a legacy to the University of
North Carolina, and $8,600 for advice on tax and other problems in
the termination of the trust and distribution of the trust properties.
The regulations were promptly liberalized early in 1946.2 The
amended regulations permit a deduction for "reasonable amounts paid
257. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945), re-
versing 145 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1944), reversing 2 T.C. 853 (1943). At p. 377:
"So far as this Regulation [§ 23(a) (2)] purports to deny deduction of litigation
expense unless it is to produce income, it is not in conformity with the statute . . .
which provides that in addition to expenses for the production or collection of trust
income, expenses of management or conservation of trust property held for the
production of income are also deductible."
258. T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 96.
259. Stoddard v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Hord
v. Commissioner of int. Rev., 143 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1944); Higgins v. Commis-
sioner of Int. Rev., 143 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1944); Davis v. Commissioner of int.
Rev., 151 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Kenan, 145 F.2d
568 (2d Cir. 1944).
260. T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 96. The following items were considered
non-deductible:
1. The expenses of a decedent's personal representative for
(a) "securing the processes and orders of the court having jurisdiction over the
probate of [an] estate,"
(b) "adjusting claims against the estate," or
(c) "distributing the remaining assets to the beneficiaries."
2. The ordinary expenses of receivership or bankruptcy, such as
(a) "fees paid to the attorney for .. .petitioning creditors,"
(b) "fees paid to the appraisers," and
(c) the expenses of the "collection of the assets and their preservation pending
ultimate distribution to the parties entitled thereto."
3. Expenditures incurred for the purpose of
(a) "preparing tax returns (except to the extent such returns relate to taxes
on property held for the production of income),"
(b) "recovering taxes (other than recoveries required to be included in income),"
or
(c) "resisting a proposed additional assessment of taxes (other than taxes on
property held for the production of income)."
261. 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
262. See note 259 supra.
263. T.D. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 61.
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or incurred by the fiduciary of an estate or trust on account of admin-
istration expenses, including fiduciaries' fees and expenses of litiga-
tion." 264 This language now permits an executor or administrator in
determining taxable income to deduct statutory fees for regular probate
services.265 The prohibition against the deduction of receiver's fees
was deleted.266 The regulations spelled out a deduction for the expenses
of determining the liability for taxes upon income, and property taxes on
income producing property, although they persisted in denying a deduc-
tion for the cost of determining gift taxes, "except to the extent that
such expenses are allocable to interest on a refund of gift taxes." 267
Subsequent cases have repeatedly allowed a deduction for the cost
of income tax litigation, whether recovering an overpayment, 268 resist-
ing a deficiency successfully 269 or unsuccessfully, 70 defending against
transferee liability,27' defending a civil fraud charge, though unsuc-
cessfully,' or in attempts to determine and settle the tax liability prior
to an indictment and conviction for criminal fraud. 78 Similarly fees
paid either by the executor 274 or remainderman 27 5 in the determina-
tion of an estate tax liability are deductible.
264. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(i); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-
15(b).
265. Special letter ruling dated Sept. 22, 1947, signed Fred. S. Martin, Acting
Deputy Commissioner (IT:P:TR-RFD-5), 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAX SERv. 1[6043.
266. T.D. 5513, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 61. Receivers' expenses of petitions, ap-
praisers, collecting and distributing property would now be deductible. Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945) ; Trustees of Series
Q, Group Certificates of New York Title and Mortgage Co., 2 T.C. 990 (1943).
267. This has been changed by the 1954 Code. See text at note 251 mipra.
268. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945); Howard E. Cammack,
5 T.C. 467 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 2.
269. James A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946); Norbert H. Wiesler, 6 T.C. 1148
(1946); Herbert Marshall, 5 T.C. 1032 (1945); Stoddard v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 152 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1945).
270. William Heyman, 6 T.C. 799 (1946); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner
of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
271. Charles N. Manning, 3 T.C. 853 (1944), aff'd, 148 F2d 821 (6th Cir.
1945); Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C. 359 (1946); National Ass'n of Schools and Pub-
lishers, Inc., 7 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 655 (1948).
272. Charles Goodman, 9 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 789 (1950); Greene Motor Co.,
5 T.C. 314 (1945) (where compromise included criminal liability).
273. Hymie Schwartz, 22 T.C. No. 91 (1954) (note five judges dissented and
quaere what influence the termination of the attorney's employment before trial
and conviction had).
274. See note 265 supra.
275. Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1954), affirming
McKinstry v. Harrison, 4 P-H (1953) FED. TAX SERv. 1 72,397 (N.D. II.) ; cf. Selig
v. Allen, 104 F. Supp. 390 (M.D. Ga., 1952), aff'd, 200 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1952). The
decision in Marion A. Burtbeck, 15 T.C. 642 (1950) seemingly contra, is distinguish-
able since it was not shown there what part of the fees in a will contest were
allocable to resisting inheritance and estate taxes.
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Production or Collection of Income
The expense, to be deductible, need not relate to the production or
collection of income in the current taxable year .1 6  Although there
have been no decisions on point, if the expense relates to an attempt to
collect specific income, it should make no difference whether the at-
tempt be successful unless its failure may be traced to some fault on
the taxpayer's part.27 7  Despite speculation to the contrary, 78 when
there has been an effort to collect income, its failure is immaterial on
the question of whether the costs are deductible. This view is based
upon the following reasons:
1. The committee reports included in "income," "income which
the taxpayer . . . may realize in subsequent taxable years." 279 Ad-
ministratively, therefore, were the rule that income must be success-
fully produced or collected, it would be impossible to pass upon the de-
duction in an audit, if at the time of the audit the success of the effort
were still in doubt. 80
2. Congress in 1942, while using much of the language recom-
mended in 1938 by a Ways and Means Committee subcommittee, re-
jected the limitation then proposed that the deduction not be in excess
of one-half the income collected. This rejection gives rise to the infer-
ence that none need be collected.28'
3. The regulations 282 would allow a deduction for "expenditures
incurred . . . in recovering property . . . which if . . . re-
covered, must be included in income." 283 The words "if recovered"
would have no purpose if the deduction depended upon a successful
recovery.
276. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(b).
277. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Josephs, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Com-
missioner of Int. Rev. v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948). But see the discussion
of these cases in text at notes 154 and 219 supra.
278. Note, Deductibility of Non-Business Legal Expenses from Gross Income,
97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 251 (1948).
279. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
372, 429; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
504, 570-71.
280. The statute of limitations runs three years after the income tax return is
filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a). An expense is deductible when paid or incurred. I.R.C.
§ 162. There is no provision to- defer the deduction and use it as a set-off when the
income might come in in a subsequent year.
281. See Brodsky and McKibben, Deductiont of Non-Trade or Non-Business
Expenses, 2 TAx L. REv. 39, 40 n.8, 48 n.47 (1946).
282. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(k).
283. Cf. Brodsky and McKibben, supra note 281, at 48.
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4. To the extent that Sections 23(a) (1) and 23(a) (2) of the
1939 Code were in "pari materia," 284 the result should be the same
as in the business expense cases where the deduction is allowed in un-
successful suits.2" 5 The Third Circuit has stated: "Nor is it a require-
ment that the expenses have been incurred in the production of incomhe,
or actually productive of income." 286
5. While the Tax Court dissenting opinions in the fiduciary sur-
charge cases 287 may have turned on failure to collect income, neither
court of appeals in reversing adopted the reasoning of the dissent. Judge
Learned Hand 288 flatly refused to subsidize inattentive or delinquent
trustees and the Eighth Circuit followed suit.2 8  Also Judge Hand
carefully pointed out that his decision did not turn on any difference be-
tween the "income" and the "management" paragraphs of Section
23 (a) (2),29 and lack of success in "management" suits does not spoil
the deduction of their costs.
291
6. Finally, the Supreme Court did not deny a deduction for elec-
tion expenses on the ground that the candidate lost.292 Justice Black
and three others would have allowed the deduction squarely as an ex-
pense for the production or collection of income.293
Although the regulations 294 mention only fees for collecting rents
and interest, the decisions are clear that fees are fully deductible for
the collection of salaries, 295 bonus, 296 commissions,2 9 7 dividends and
interest,298 royalties (where title is not in issue),299 taxable alimony,"°
284. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
285. Udolpho Wolfe Co., 15 B.T.A. 485 (1929), acq., VIII-2 Cum. BuL. 57;
E. L. Potter, 20 B.T.A. 252 (1930), nonacq., X-1 Cum. BuLL. 90 (1931).
286. Urquhart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954).
287. Julius A. Heide, 8 T.C. 314 (1947); Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T.C. 583 (1947).
288. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1948).
289. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Josephs, 168 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
290. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1948).
291. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945);
William Heyman, 6 T.C. 799 (1946); Carl W. Braznell, 16 T.C. 503 (1951).
292. McDonald v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
293. See Brodsky and McKibben, mupra note 281, at 48; Nahstoll, Non-Trade and
Non-Business Expense Deductions, 46 MicH. L. REv. 1015, 1020-23 (1948).
294. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(k) (1953).
295. E. L. Potter, 20 B.T.A. 252 (1930), nonacq., X-1 Cum. Bu. 90 (1931).
296. Joseph Frank, 22 T.C. No. 113 (1954).
297. Annie Laurie Crawford, 5 T.C. 91 (1945).
298. Virginia Hansen Vincent, 18 T.C. 339 (1952).
299. Jack Rosenzweig, I T.C. 24 (1942), acq., 1943 CuM. BuLL. 19; Raymond
M. Hessert, I CCH TC MEm. DEC. 932 (1943); Pierce Estates, Inc., 3 T.C. 875
(1944), nonacq., 1944 Cum. BuLL. 51; Urquhart v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 215
F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954).
300. T.D. 5889, 1952-1 Cus. BuLL. 31; Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949);
Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949). This represents a reversal of I.T. 3856, 1947-1
Cum. BuLL. 23, which considered the expense "personal."
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trust income,301 sweepstakes winnings,"0 2 and damages for breach of
a contract to sell.803
Collecting the Proceeds from the Sale of Property
When lawyers' fees arise from litigation relating to the sale of
property, even now it is uncertain whether they are merely direct
charges to the profit or loss on the particular sale, like brokers' com-
missions on the sale of stock,304 or are fully deductible as a fee paid for
the production of income or management of property held for the pro-
duction of income. The distinction is important because, where long
term capital gain or capital loss results from the sale, if the litigation
costs are a direct charge against the proceeds the tax benefit is cut
to one-half or, if the capital loss is not deductible, even to zero. 03 Un-
til the law is clarified, by statute or decision, such attorneys' fees should
be claimed in full as a deduction.0 6
In commenting on the 1942 amendment which created a deduc-
tion against gross income for expenses "for the production or collec-
tion of income," 307 both the House and Senate reports on the bill state
that, "The term 'income' for this purpose . . . is not confined to
recurring income but applies as well to gain from the disposition of
property." 308 It is immaterial that such gain may be capital gain;
the deduction is an ordinary deduction in the Fifth 09 and Ninth 3' 0
Circuits, but in the Eighth it is an offset against the proceeds of sale.31'
301. Mary deF. Harrison Geary, 9 T.C. 8 (1947); Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C.
135 (1946).
302. Harry Kanelos, 2 CCH TC MEmt. DEc. 806 (1943).
303. Joseph G. Hitner, 1 CCH TC M~xa. DEc. 596 (1943).
304. Spreckels v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 315 U.S. 626 (1942); G.C.M. 15430,
XIV-2 Cuat. BuL.. 59 (1935).
305. A capital loss is nondeductible if it exceeds capital gains in the case of
corporations or exceeds capital gains by more than $1000 per year for individuals
for the current year and the five succeeding carry-over years.
306. Support for this claim is found in Agnes Pyne Coke, 17 T.C. 403 (1951),
aff'd per curiarn, 201 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943),
aff'd, 147 F2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945) ; cf. McDonald
v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
307. INT. REv. CoDE of 1939, § 23(a) (2), as amended, 56 STAT. 819, now I.R.C.
§212 (1).
308. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
372, 430; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1942), 1942-2 Com. BuLL.
504, 571.
309. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Coke, 201 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1953), affirming
per curiam 17 T.C. 403 (1951) (deduction of legal fees in collecting the proceeds
of stock sold at a capital gain in the settlement of a separation dispute between hus-
band and wife).
310. Helter v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945) (legal costs of appraising a dissenter's stock in a pro-
posed merger).
311. Davis v. Conissioner of Int. Rev., 151 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 783 (1946) (straight commission in the ordinary sale of securities).
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Of the five Tax Court decisions where the issue is clearly seen, three
take the ordinary deduction view,812 two treat such expense as a direct
offset to the proceeds.' 1 In addition, there are several Tax Court
decisions where the language, without any analysis in the opinion,
would sustain the full deduction 814 and several, again without reasoning
or cited authority, which simply state that sales expense is set off against
capital gain.3 18
The argument for the offset treatment 3 1 is built upon the lan-
guage in the committee reports that "[a] deduction under this section
is subject, except for the requirement of being incurred in connection
with a trade or business, to all the restrictions and limitations that
apply in the case of the deduction under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of an
expense paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business." 31
Then, by reference to the pari materia language in the Bingham case, 18
forgetting that the Supreme Court had limited that decision to inter-
pretation only of the management of property paragraph of the 1942
amendment, 19 legal expenses not deductible to a business are not de-
ductible to an individual." Spreckels v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue holds that commissions on the sale of stock "have been 'con-
sistently treated . . not as items of current expense, but as .
deductions from the proceeds of sale,' "82 and are, therefore, not a
business expense deduction.
The "restrictions and limitations" language of the legislative re-
ports can be given adequate scope by limiting it to the statutory restric-
tions, such as that the expense be ordinary, necessary, reasonable, not
312. Agnes Pyne Coke, 17 T.C. 403, 408 (1951); Robert D. L. Gardiner, 4
CCH TC Mm. DEC. 689 (1945); Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
313. H. C. Naylor, 17 T.C. 959 (1951); Don A. Davis, 4 T.C. 329 (1944).
314. Brad Love Sneed, 12 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 711 (1953); Truman H. New-
berry, 4 CCH TC MEM. DEc. 576 (1945); see Charles N. Manning, 3 T.C. 853,
874 (1944); Margery K. Megargel, 3 T.C. 238, 251 (1944) (where although the
language of the opinion was broad, petitioners own attorneys submitted a Rule 50
computation treating the fees as an offset to sales proceeds, thus cutting the deduction
in half); James S. Floyd, 2 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 776 (1943); Raymond M. Hessert,
1 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 932 (1943).
315. Joseph Frank, 22 T.C. No. 113 (1954); Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332
(1953); William Justin Petit, 8 T.C. 228 (1947).
316. Davis v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 151 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 783 (1946).
317. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BuLL.
372, 430; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. BuLL.
504, 571.
318. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365, '373-74
(1945).
319. Id. at 371; cf. Julius A. Heide, 8 T.C. 314, 321 (1947) (dissenting opinion);
Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T.C. 583, 589-91 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
320. Davis v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 151 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 783 (1946).
321. 315 U.S. 626, 629 (1942).
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personal, not a capital expenditure to increase the value of any property
or estate, and not allocable to tax exempt income. Neither the Treas-
ury G.C.M. nor the Supreme Court opinion in the Spreckels case calls
sales expenses "capital expenditures." 32 The Court simply held they
were not "business expenses." Therefore, not being a business ex-
pense in the first place, they cannot be within the meaning of "restric-
tions and limitations" on the deduction of business expenses.
Whichever way the next court of appeals to face the issue may de-
cide, whether allowing a full deduction under the statutory language
"for the production and collection of income" and the express indica-
tion in the committee reports that "income" meant gain on the sale of
property, or disallowance relying on the general language in the same
reports and a feeling that Congress did not intend what it said, the
Supreme Court should recognize the conflict and eliminate the con-
fusion.
Apart from the problem of the proper treatment of attorneys' fees
which, like brokers' commissions, may be considered "selling expenses,"
Naylor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1 indicates one precau-
tion the practicing attorney should take. When negotiating a contract
for the seller, once the contract terms have been settled and the agree-
ment has become binding so that an action for damages or specific
enforcement would lie, the attorney should close his books and set a
fee. The fee for any further services in the nature of enforcing the
agreement and collecting income is fully deductible.
Fees for Property Management
Despite the Treasury's early efforts to limit the non-business de-
duction authorized by the 1942 amendments to expenses of producing
or collecting income, 2 4 in 1945 the Bingham decision 2 5 underlined
the sub-section allowing a deduction for the expenses "for the manage-
ment, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production
of income." 326 Most legal fees are allowed as expenses of "manage-
ment," though in one or two cases the opinions have referred only to
"conservation or maintenance." '27
322. G.C.M. 15430, XIV-2 Cum. BuLL. 59 (1935); Spreckels v. Commissioner
of Int. Rev., 315 U.S. 626 (1942).
323. 203 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1953).
324. T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 96. See text at note 260 and note 260 supra.
325. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
326. I.R.C. § 212(2).
327. Baer v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952); James
A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946); Truman H. Newberry, 4 CCH TC Maim. Dc.
576 (1945).
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The "property" managed may be in almost any form productive
of income, although an unliquidated claim against a guardian and his
surety 28 and a claim under an agreement restricting the sale of
stock 329 have failed to qualify. The taxpayer claiming the deduction
must have legal title ' or an equitable income interest 331 in the
property.
An individual may deduct fees for legal advice and investment
counsel as to investments in securities 382 and real estate, and as to the
management of corporations 333 or trusts " in which he owns an in-
terest. Similarly, fees paid for advice in "conserving and maintaining"
a block of stock which gave the taxpayer control of a corporation,83 5 or
in defense of damage suits for refusing to carry out a contract to sell
real estate 336 or stock 17 are deductible. Note that in these cases the
defendant's title to the property was not considered in issue. Likewise
title to property is not considered in issue when a trust settlor sues to
set the transfer aside. His legal fees are deductible as expenses of con-
servation and management.38
Individuals often engage an attorney for "estate planning," but
he should be cautious not to bill for the work as a unit; 3 9 only some
of the services involved are deductible. The problem was squarely
presented in Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 4" the sole case on all fours.
A member of the R. J. Reynolds family, Mts. Bagley undertook
extensive estate planning. She was allowed to deduct the fee paid to a
firm of "estate planners" who made a survey of her properties and
proposed a plan of reinvestment including inter vivos and testamentary
trusts and insurance. Her attorneys' fees were held deductible for
advice on (1) the advisability of purchasing interest-bearing securties,
(2) the making of interest-bearing loans to corporate officers to pro-
tect her investment in the family corporation, and (3) the merit of
328. Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944).
329. Dorothy E. Law, 12 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 1440 (1953).
330. Compare Baer v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 196 F2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952),
zith Dorothy E. Law, 12 CCH TC Max. DEc. 1440 (1953).
331. Compare Herman W. Fletcher, 10 CCH TC Mam. DEc. 793 (1951), with
Frederic A. Seidler, 18 T.C. 256 (1952), or Wayne Henderson, 11 CCH TC MEm.
DEc. 419 (1952).
332. Winifred L. Milner Estate, 1 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 513 (1943).
333. Edward G. Acheson, Jr., 1 CCH TC Mam. DEc. 877 (1943).
334. Herman W. Fletcher, 10 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 793 (1951).
335. Baer v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
336. Carl W. Braznell, 16 T.C. 503 (1951).
337. William P. Toms, 5 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 183 (1946).
338. William J. Garland, 2 CCH TC MEa. DEc. 419 (1943).
339. See Section on Allocation infra following note 351.
340. 8 T.C. 130 (1947), acq., 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 1,
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plans offered her by investment counsel for the rearrangement and re-
investment of her income-producing property.
At the same time, the Tax Court held attorneys' fees not deduc-
tible for (1) advice as to the nature and type of securities and cash
which should be set aside from her property to form the principal of the
trust for her daughter and for (2) the release of powers of appointment
over a trust, in which she was the life beneficiary, which in no way af-
fected her income but only assured her children of receiving the property
after her death. Other nondeductible estate planning services are the
writing of a will 34 and the legal services in connection with the making
of gifts.3 A lump sum statement, therefore, for "estate planning" will
invite at least an arbitrary allocation by the revenue agent leaning
heavily on the value of nondeductible services.
While several opinions have intimated that, in the application of
the management provisions, the interposition of a trustee makes no
difference,343 the courts seem to have been more liberal in allowing de-
ductions for expenses incurred by trustees than for expenses incurred
by individuals. The trustee's or executor's activity is considered anal-
ogous to a business. 44  He is allowed to deduct the costs of collecting
income due his decedent, even though it is not taxable to the estate. 45
He can deduct the costs of distributing income-producing property, 46
and guardians' fees paid for incompetents, minors and unborn inter-
ests,347 although such a deduction would be denied an individual.38
This same business conduct concept with its attendant liberality ex-
tends to other fiduciaries, such as incompetents', committees, 49 guard-
ians for minors,3 °0 and receivers in bankruptcy.3 5'
341. Estate of Helen S. Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926).
342. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
343. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 571 (2d Cir. 1945); Howard E.
Cammack, 5 T.C. 467, 470 (1945).
344. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365, 374 (1945).
345. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Goldberger's Estate, 213 F2d 78 (3d Cir.
1954); James H. Knox Trust, 4 T.C. 258 (1944).
346. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
347. Amy DuPuy McHenry, 6 CCH TC MEm. DE C. 1027 (1947).
348. Cf. Thomas A. Kane, 6 CCH TC MEmX. DEc. 222 (1947) (recovery of
stock) ; Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) (costs of giving away income
producing property); Dorothy E. Law, 12 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 1440 (1953) (legal
fees to protect another's income producing property).
349. Estate of Elsie Weil, 13 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 653 (1954) ; Kohnstamm v.
Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1945).
350. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Estate of Bartholomew, 151 F.2d 534 (9th
Cir. 1945), affirming 4 T.C. 349 (1944); Spear v. Gagne, 49 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.H.
1943).
351. Trustee of Series Q, Group Certficates of New York Title and Mortgage
Co., 2 T.C. 990 (1943).
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ALLOCATION
Couple the nondeductibility of fees for some legal services and
the deductibility of others in a single cause, with the difficulties in prac-
tice of segregating the deductible from the non-deductible items before
making entries on office time records, and a knotty problem arises both
for the attorney and the courts. When services for a single client are
both deductible and nondeductible, how should the fee be allocated?
The regulations give ample justification for the division of a fee,
allocating part to deductible expense and part to non-deductible serv-
ices.'52 The most defensible method of allocation is direct tracing based
upon time records which show the subject matter on which the work
is done, giving proper weight, however, to the other factors relevant
in setting the fee. 53 Since the fee is not based solely on time and labor
in most cases, the billing attorney's own allocation of his fee among
the services should be entitled to great weight.3 54  Certainly deductible
and nondeductible items should be individually priced if they are in-
cluded in a single itemized statement.355
When the services are rendered on a retainer basis or the billing
attorney has neglected to value the services individually even though
itemizing them, an allocation made by the courts to allow some deduc-
tions is usually either (1) in direct proportion to the amounts re-
covered or claimed, or (2) on the basis of the number of issues in-
volved, or (3) the court will "make as close an approximation as it can,
bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is
of his own making" 356 (or his attorney's). Even so, there are judges
who will simply deny any deduction for failure of proof if the problem
of allocation presents a hurdle. 57  As the Commissioner himself at
least once in the regulations "' established a precedent, the philosophy
of which unfortunately his representatives do not always accept, it is
352. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a) -15 (k) (1953), specifically allows a de-
duction for the portion of a fee "properly allocable" to accrued rents, and to interest
on a gift tax refund. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§39.24(a)-4(a), 39.24(a)-4(b)(2)
(1953), require an allocation of expenses between taxable and tax exempt income.
353. CANONS OF PRoFEssioNAL ETHiCS, Canon 12 (A.B.A. 1908, as amended,
1937).
354. Note that it was not questioned in Trust of Bingham, 2 T.C. 853, 856
(1943); Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947), acq., 1947-1 Cum. Bumi. 1;
Herman W. Fletcher, 10 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 793 (1951).
355. A. H. Morse Co., 11 CCH TC MFm. D c. 1099, 1103 (1952).
356. Cohan v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930).
357. E.g., William Justin Petit, 8 T.C. 228, 236 (1947); Cecil B. Highland,
43 B.T.A. 598 (1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1942). For discussion of the
conflicting views see Hochschild v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 161 F.2d 817, 820 (2d
Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
358. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(k) (1953).
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to be trusted that judges who refuse to allocate will become a declining
minority.
The direct proportion, or percentage, theory of allocation is most
easily applied where the suit is for principal and interest. To use the
Commissioner's own illustration,3 9 a suit before 1954 for refund of
gift taxes, the percentage of fee proportionate to the tax recovered was
not deductible; that proportionate to the interest was deductible. Often
applied,36 the rule may be used even if the attorney represents the
losing party. 6' When the court takes the ordinary deduction view of
attorneys' fees in the disposition of property,"0 2 the fee is divided by
reference to the "basis" of the property in relation to the total recovery
including capital gain. 63
Where the fee involves management expense, rather than collec-
tion expense, or the amount of income is indeterminate, the percentage
allocation cannot be used. This is true in cases of abandoned reorgani-
zation or recapitalization plans and corporate liquidations. Here there
is apparently a tendency to allocate the fee on the number of issues
involved.364
Where the court is satisfied some deductible legal expense was in-
curred, it has called upon its own experience from the usually meager
testimony available to "make as close an approximation as it can."
This is the doctrine of the famous case of Cohan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. 65 Where the revenue agent has already allowed a
359. Ibid.
360. Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944) (successful surcharge
of a guardian, principal 40.82%, interest 59.18%); Harold K. Hochschild, 7 T.C.
81 (1946), acq., 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 3 (successful defense of stock 85%, interim divi-
dends 15%) ; Edmunds v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (principal
plus interest on estate tax refund) ; Specialty Engineering Co., 12 T.C. 1173 (1949),
acq., 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 5 (recovery of value of partnership interest plus interest) ;
Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949) (non-taxable alimony 20%, taxable ali-
mony 80%) ; Kimbrell v. Dallman, 80 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ill. 1948) (mineral interest
and impounded royalties, showing that percentage depletion reduces the income factor).
361. William A. Falls, 7 T.C. 66 (1946), acq., 1946-2 Cum. BuIL.. 2 (unsuccessful
defense of patents 6.27% and past royalties 93.73%).
362. See text at note 309 vpra.
363. Agnes Pyne Coke, 17 T.C. 403 (1951), aj'd per curiain, 201 F.2d 742 (5th
Cir. 1953) (petitioner's stock sold in settlement of community property suit for
$246,560; basis, $61,425; gain, $185,135; deductible portion of fee $185,135/$246,560,
or 75%).
364. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 15 T.C. 106 (1950) ; Tobacco Products Export
Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952); cf. E. J. Murray, 21 T.C. 1049 (1954).
365. 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930), Judge Learned Hand, in commenting
on the Board's refusal to allow any entertainment expense: "Absolute certainty in
such matters is usually impossible and is not necessary; the Board should make as
close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer
whose inexactitude is of his own making. But to allow nothing at all appears to us
inconsistent with saying that something was spent." For an exhaustive analysis of
the Cohan doctrine, see Gluck, How Cohan Works: Allowance of Business Expense
Deductions When No Exact Records Are Kept, 6 RUTGExs L. Rsv. 375 (1952).
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deduction for some of the fee, there is authority for refusing to apply
the rule.36
You cannot safely count on the courts to allocate. In many cases
they have refused, 67 even though the taxpayer had recovered substan-
tial amounts of taxable interest in the suit, and the treatment of the
entire fee as "capital" was completely to deprive the taxpayer of any tax
benefit from the payment. 68 Moreover, the Tax Court itself has di-
vided sharply on the problem. 69 Your best defense is to prepare your
case in advance-make your own allocation when you send the bill.
CONCLUSION
When in order to pay each $100 of nondeductible attorney's fee,
corporations must have from $142 to $208 of pre-tax income and in-
dividuals, partnerships and estates must have from $125, to $1,111,
you can be of real service to your clients by insuring that each dollar
of deductible fee is clearly identified. Although the client does not
usually raise the question until he sees the bill, it should come to your
thoughts at the very beginning of your service for him.
The manner of carrying out a settlement of a dispute may affect
the deductibility of the fee, and should be kept in mind in the negotia-
tions. When claims are stated in the pleadings, the first step in de-
termining whether your fee is deductible has been taken.
Your work should be planned so that the deductible services can
be identified and segregated either in time of performance or in time
record descriptions. Arguments with the revenue agent can be
avoided if billing is kept sufficiently current so that the work done is
clearly in mind, and is described clearly and separately valued on the
fee statement.
As we have seen, both court decisions and Congressional amend-
ments over the last fifteen years have widened the area of deductible fees.
366. Frieda Hempel, 11 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1070 (1952).
367. Midco Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 587 (1953); E. S. Shipp, 12 CCH TC MEm.
DEC. 682 (1953) ; William Justin Petit, 8 T.C. 228 (1947).
368. Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.
1953); Isaac G. Johnson & Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945); cf.
William Justin Petit, 8 T.C. 228, 236-37 '(1947): In denying the allocation Judge
Black said, "There is no warrant in law for this. The attorney fees which petitioner
paid to Hill, Morgan & Bledsoe were for their entire services in the condemnation
proceeding and there is no basis for allocating $8,878.36 of the fee for the collection
of interest. The entire amount paid the attorneys for their services must be treated
as capital expenditures." He apparently had not looked at the Commissioner's own
regulations.
369. In Midco Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 587 (1953), Judges Opper, Kern, Arundell,
Johnson and Tietjens dissented.
1954] DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 207
Still some of the confusing problems would be eliminated if the courts
or Congress made clear the extent of the allowable deduction for pro-
ducing capital gain; insisted that there be a reasonable allocation when
some deductible amount has certainly been paid; and terminate the
nondeductibility of "defense of title" expenses where they are not "to
increase the value of any property" over its original value at time of
acquisition.
